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Essay 
Griswold ’s Criminal Law 
MELISSA MURRAY 
This Symposium commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of Griswold v. 
Connecticut. In the fifty years since it was announced, Griswold’s logic has 
underwritten a broader commitment to reproductive rights—one that has 
expanded the right to contraception and secured a woman’s right to 
choose an abortion. Amidst these developments it is easy to overlook 
another aspect of Griswold’s history. Griswold also was part of a criminal 
law reform effort that sought to reimagine the state’s authority in the 
intimate lives of citizens and limit the use of criminal law as a means of 
enforcing moral conformity. In this regard, Griswold shares roots with the 
Model Penal Code, the Wolfenden Report, and the Hart-Devlin Debates—
all of which arose in a social and legal milieu in which the question of 
whether the state could—or should—police intimate conduct through the 
criminal law was a subject of considerable debate. In overlooking this 
aspect of Griswold, we have obscured its historical context and, perhaps 
more troublingly, limited its impact in defining the extent of the state’s 
power to regulate sex and sexuality. This brief Essay recovers this 
overlooked aspect of Griswold’s history. In so doing, it situates Griswold 
in this historical debate about the scope and limits of the state’s authority 
to police intimate life through the criminal law. As importantly, it 
considers the implications of this history for our contemporary efforts to 
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GRISWOLD’S CRIMINAL LAW 
MELISSA MURRAY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of Griswold v. 
Connecticut,1 the United States Supreme Court decision that famously 
articulated a right to privacy.2 In the fifty years since it was announced, 
Griswold’s logic has underwritten a broader commitment to reproductive 
rights—one that has expanded the right to contraception3 and secured a 
woman’s right to choose an abortion.4 Amidst all of these developments it 
is easy to overlook another aspect of Griswold’s history. Although 
Griswold was part of a larger campaign to expand access to birth control,5 
it was also part of another historical moment, one that sought to reimagine 
the state’s authority in the intimate lives of citizens and limit the use of 
criminal law as a means of enforcing moral conformity. In this regard, 
Griswold arose in a social and legal milieu in which the question of 
whether the state could—or should—police intimate conduct through the 
criminal law was a subject of considerable debate. 
Few have explored the criminal law aspect of Griswold. This oversight 
is unfortunate. In overlooking this part of Griswold, we have obscured its 
historical context and, perhaps more troublingly, limited its impact in 
defining the extent of the state’s power to regulate sex and sexuality. This 
brief Essay recovers this overlooked aspect of Griswold’s history. In so 
doing, it situates Griswold in this historical debate about the scope and 
limits of the state’s authority to police intimate life through the criminal 
                                                                                                                          
 Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. K.T. Albiston, Bennett Capers, Doug 
NeJaime, Alice Ristroph, Reva Siegel, Karen Tani, and Rose Cuison Villazor provided very helpful 
comments and feedback. Michael Levy of the Berkeley Law Library went above and beyond in 
providing necessary guidance and assistance. Finally, I am grateful to Sheila Menz, Maya Khan, and 
Lydia Anderson-Dana for superlative research assistance. 
1 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
2 Id. at 486 (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our 
political parties, older than our school system.”). 
3 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If under Griswold the distribution of 
contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons 
would be equally impermissible.”). 
4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal 
privacy includes the abortion decision . . . .”). 
5 See generally DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1998) (offering a detailed account of the campaign against prohibitions on 
contraception). 
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law. As importantly, it considers the implications of this history for our 
contemporary efforts to expand sexual liberty. 
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part II begins in the 1940s and 
1950s and documents the debate over the state’s use of the criminal law to 
police morality and the resulting effort to liberalize the criminal laws that 
regulated various aspects of intimate life. Part III then shifts to the 1960s to 
recover connections between Griswold and this criminal law reform effort. 
As it explains, although we regard Griswold as part of the Sexual 
Revolution and the liberalization of norms regarding sex and sexuality, the 
case was also part of a related effort to modernize and reform the criminal 
law and limit the state’s ability to regulate intimate life. Part IV considers 
why this aspect of Griswold has been overlooked. It suggests that 
Griswold’s emphasis on privacy—and specifically, the privacy rights of 
married couples—had the effect of subordinating the broader debate about 
the use of criminal law to police and enforce majoritarian moral values 
about sex and sexuality. Indeed, it would be almost forty years before the 
principles and values that animated the criminal law reform effort would 
be fully reflected in the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence. In the 
2003 case Lawrence v. Texas,6 a majority of the Court not only elaborated 
Griswold’s understanding of privacy to include the unmarried, it squarely 
confronted the debate over the state’s use of criminal law to police and 
enforce moral conformity.7 
Part IV also considers the implications of this reclaimed history. As it 
explains, recovering Griswold’s criminal law antecedents not only 
provides a more complete historical narrative for locating the case and 
assessing its legacy, it also underscores the continued relevancy of the 
normative question at the heart of the criminal law reform debate and 
Griswold: Should the state use its authority to enforce moral conformity 
among its citizens? Although Lawrence built upon Griswold to limit the 
state’s ability to use the criminal law to regulate sexual morality, the state 
continues to rely on civil means to accomplish many of these ends. The 
civil regulation of sex and sexuality, however, has gone largely unnoticed. 
In this regard, the broader debate over state authority to regulate sex and 
sexuality, of which Griswold was a crucial part, persists in contemporary 
legal culture. Recovering Griswold’s place in the debate over the state’s 
regulation of sexual morality provides an important opportunity to consider 
how and why state regulation of sex and sexuality has persisted in the face 
of constitutional protections for privacy in intimate life.  
                                                                                                                          
6 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
7 Id. at 571, 578–79. 
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II.  BEFORE GRISWOLD:                                                                                            
MORALS LEGISLATION AND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM 
Since the founding, American jurisdictions relied on the criminal law 
to regulate sex and sexuality.8 In many states, sex outside of marriage was 
punished under laws prohibiting fornication or adultery.9 Sodomy—the 
infamous “crime against nature”—was subject to a prison term.10 Even 
efforts to control reproduction through contraception or abortion were 
routinely criminalized in order to deter promiscuity and channel sex into 
marriage.11   
The state’s ability to regulate intimate life in this manner was widely 
acknowledged to be within the scope of its police power to promote the 
health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.12 But by the 1940s and 
1950s, this traditional authority was being called into question. In two 
ground-breaking sex studies, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male13 and 
Sexual Behavior in the Human Female,14 Indiana University’s Alfred 
Kinsey drew back the curtain on the intimate lives of everyday Americans. 
According to Kinsey, Americans routinely engaged in sexual acts and 
practices that violated the criminal laws of most jurisdictions.15 The 
                                                                                                                          
8 See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 
IN AMERICA 15–32 (1988) (describing such “morals offenses”); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127–32 (1993) (detailing moral crimes). 
9 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 128–31 (discussing punishment of fornication and adultery); 
BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN 
REFORM TRADITION 31–33 (1987) (describing various punishments for fornication and adultery). 
10 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193–94 (1986) (discussing the history of anti-sodomy 
laws in the United States); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY 
LAWS IN AMERICA 1861–2003 17, 19–20, 53–54 (2008) (describing the history of anti-sodomy laws in 
the U.S.). 
11 See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 159–78 (1985) (discussing the criminalization of abortion and contraception); 
Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of 
Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1271–72 (2009) (discussing the ways in which criminal law 
historically has been used to enforce intimate norms); see generally LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN 
ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973 (1997) 
(discussing the criminalization of abortion). 
12 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 596 (1868) (arguing that the 
protection of public morals was a legitimate use of the state’s police power); ERNST FREUND, THE 
POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 9 (1904) (contending that the 
“cultivation of moral, intellectual and aesthetic forces and interests which advance civilisation and 
benefit the community . . . cannot be a matter of indifference to the state.”). 
13 ALFRED. C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948). 
14 ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953). 
15 ESKRIDGE JR., supra, note 10, at 109 (discussing Kinsey’s presentation of a discussion paper 
entitled “Biological Aspects of Some Social Problems,” which argued that the law was divorced from 
the reality of intimate life and calling for law reform); see also Michael Kirby, Sexuality and Global 
Forces: Dr. Alfred Kinsey and the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
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problem was not the acts themselves, which, in Kinsey’s view, were 
commonplace and therefore “normal,” but rather a religiously-inflected 
legal regime that criminalized these acts in the name of preserving 
morality.16  
But it was not just that Kinsey revealed the “incredibly wide gap 
between the law’s expectations and the people’s actual practices as to 
sexual conduct;”17 it was that the existence of the laws on the books 
seemed at odds with law enforcement priorities. In most cases, moral 
offenses went unenforced. If they were enforced, it was done selectively, 
often targeting vulnerable populations.18 In this regard, the laws’ existence, 
coupled with their frequent violation and uneven enforcement, “instilled 
cynicism toward the law,” diminishing respect for the legal system.19 Not 
content simply to note the disjunction between law’s expectations and the 
reality of quotidian life, Kinsey began advocating for legal reform.20 
Private, consensual sexual acts, Kinsey argued, should be beyond the 
purview of the criminal law.21 
Critically, Kinsey’s was not the only voice calling for criminal law 
reform. In 1954, in the United Kingdom, Parliament convened the 
Wolfenden Committee in the wake of a series of controversial prosecutions 
of prominent Londoners on charges of homosexual sodomy.22 Tasked with 
considering the ongoing efficacy of laws criminalizing homosexual 
sodomy and prostitution, the Wolfenden Committee issued a report to the 
British Parliament recommending the decriminalization of consensual 
same-sex sodomy.23 In calling for these reforms, the Wolfenden Report 
emphasized limits on the state’s authority to criminalize private, 
consensual conduct, noting that “there must remain a realm of private 
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s 
business.”24   
The Wolfenden Report prompted a series of debates between the legal 
                                                                                                                          
STUD. 485, 493 (2007) (noting that the Kinsey Reports “challenged assumptions that were generally 
accepted throughout the world concerning human sexual experience” ) (footnotes omitted). 
16 Id. 
17 GERHARD O.W. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT 17 (1961).  
18 Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offense and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671 
(1963) (“[O]ne can examine side effects of the effort to enforce morality by penal law. . . . Are police 
forces, prosecution resources, and court time being wastefully diverted from the central insecurities of 
our metropolitan life—robbery, burglary, rape, assault, and governmental corruption?”). 
19 LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 106 (2013). 
20 Id. at 105. 
21 Id. 
22 See JOHN FREDERICK WOLFENDEN, TURNING POINTS: THE MEMOIRS OF LORD WOLFENDEN 
129–46 (1976) (discussing the origins of the Wolfenden Committee). 
23 THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND 
PROSTITUTION ¶ 62, at 48 (Authorized American ed., Stein & Day 1963).  
24 Id. at ¶ 61, at 48. 
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philosopher H.L.A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin, a prominent 
conservative on Britain’s High Court, on the role that majoritarian social 
mores should play in the criminal law.25 Devlin argued that irrespective of 
harm or injury to persons or property, the criminal law legitimately could 
be used to discourage deviations from commonly-held notions of 
morality.26 In response, Hart argued that although the criminal law could 
be used to address immoral acts that posed harm to third parties or property 
(like murder or theft), it should not be used to criminalize all departures 
from majoritarian mores, including departures from commonly-held mores 
regarding out-of-wedlock sex.27   
On the other side of the Atlantic, the American Law Institute (ALI), a 
group of prominent lawyers, judges, and legal scholars charged with 
clarifying and simplifying the American common law, was also launching 
its own effort to reform and modernize American criminal law.28 Led by 
Columbia Law School professor Herbert Wechsler, the ALI’s Model Penal 
Code (MPC) project sought to draft a modern criminal code that could be 
adopted in whole or in part by individual states.29 Although the MPC’s 
drafters would consider a wide range of reforms, they took particular 
interest in the reform of the laws governing sexual offenses. In this aspect 
of the reform project, the drafters were influenced by Kinsey’s research30 
and the Wolfenden Report.31 Like the Wolfenden Committee, the MPC 
drafters worried that laws criminalizing private sexual conduct between 
consenting adults intruded too far into private life.32 As importantly, the 
drafters were sensitive to concerns that enforcing victimless sex offenses 
diverted scarce public resources from more pressing criminal justice issues, 
                                                                                                                          
25 See Mary Ann Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 
123–24 (noting that the Hart-Devlin debates were a response to the Wolfenden Report); David Alan 
Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal 
Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 914 (2008) (noting that “[t]he Hart-Devlin debate . . . was an 
outgrowth” of the Wolfenden Committee Report). 
26 See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 2–3 (1965) (discussing the role that 
criminal law should play in safeguarding society).  
27  See H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 57 (1963) (arguing that “where there is no 
harm to be prevented and no potential victim to be protected”—as is the case with “conventional sexual 
morality”—there is little value in pursuing legal punishment). 
28 ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 121. 
29 Id. 
30 WHEELER, supra note 19, at 105. Not coincidentally the ALI and Kinsey shared a prominent 
funder—the Rockefeller Foundation. Id. at 107. Kinsey himself became a forceful advocate for 
criminal law reform. In 1949, he attended an all-day forum for the Study and Prevention of Crime 
convened at Columbia University, where he advocated for changes to the laws governing sexual 
offenses. Penal Codes Seen in Need of Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1949, at 59. As he explained, 
“[n]ot more than 5 per cent of persons who pass through the courts are involved in sexual behavior 
which damages other individuals.” Id. The other 95 per cent “are involved in sexual behavior that 
transgresses laws that have no function other than to preserve custom.” Id. 
31 WHEELER, supra note 19, at 110–12. 
32 ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 121–22. 
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like rising rates of violent crime.33   
At the ALI’s annual meeting in 1962, a draft of the MPC was 
presented to the membership for approval.34 The draft’s provisions relating 
to sexual offenses reflected the sentiments of a prominent member of the 
MPC’s advisory committee, the late Judge Learned Hand. In 1955, at the 
inauguration of the MPC project, Judge Hand made clear his views of the 
state’s use of criminal law as a vehicle for enforcing morality.35 As he 
explained, “I think [the criminal regulation of sex] is a matter of morals, a 
matter largely of taste, and it is not a matter that people should be put in 
prison about.”36 The final draft of the MPC concurred, urging substantial 
changes in the laws governing adultery, fornication, prostitution, abortion, 
contraception, and private acts of sodomy between consenting adults.37 
Under the MPC, fornication and adultery were no longer criminalized.38 
State regulation of abortion was liberalized to permit “therapeutic” 
abortions in cases of rape, incest, and harm—broadly conceived—to the 
mother.39 Criminalization of sodomy was reserved for circumstances 
involving force and/or public conduct.40  
The draft was eventually approved by a vote of the ALI’s 
membership.41 And, as the MPC drafters hoped, the ALI’s effort to reform 
sexual offenses spawned similar legislative reform efforts in other 
jurisdictions, including Illinois and New York.42  
In seeking legislative reform of extant criminal laws regulating sex and 
sexuality, the MPC, the Wolfenden Report, and many of the state 
legislative reform efforts emphasized a sphere of private, intimate life 
secluded from the state and insulated from criminal regulation.43 By the 
1950s and 1960s, the concept of a zone of privacy beyond the state’s 
regulatory ambit began to coalesce in two Supreme Court decisions 
concerning the scope of constitutional protections for criminal defendants.   
In Rochin v. California,44 the Supreme Court reversed a criminal 
                                                                                                                          
33 See id. at 122 (“[S]carce enforcement resources are better deployed against activities that cause 
serious harm.”); Schwartz, supra note 18, at 671 (arguing that one side effect of the effort to enforce 
morality by penal law is that “police forces, prosecution resources, and court time” are wastefully 
diverted from more “central” concerns, such as “robbery, burglary, rape, assault, and government 
corruption”). 
34 ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 124. 
35 Anthony Lewis, Morals Issue: Crime or Not?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1964, at E10. 
36 Id. 
37 ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 123–24. 
38 Id. 
39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (1962). 
40 ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 124. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 137 (noting the “liberal discourse of privacy that undergirded the Model Penal Code and 
the Wolfenden Report . . . .” (italics omitted)). 
44 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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conviction that was based upon evidence obtained when police officers 
forcibly entered the bedroom of a suspect and his wife.45 According to the 
Court, the officers’ efforts to obtain evidence of criminal wrongdoing, 
which included “[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner,” 
forcibly opening his mouth to remove recently-swallowed materials, and 
ordering the “forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents,” “shock[ed] the 
conscience.”46 Evidence obtained through such “brutal conduct” was akin 
to a coerced confession, and as such, violated the Due Process Clause.47  
Nearly a decade later, Mapp v. Ohio48 offered the Court an opportunity 
to elaborate the contours of these constitutional protections. Like Rochin, 
Mapp involved an intrusive search of an individual’s home. Brandishing a 
fabricated warrant, Cleveland police officers initiated a thorough search of 
Dollree Mapp’s home, including her bedroom, her “child’s bedroom, the 
living room, the kitchen and a dinette.”49 They ultimately discovered a 
cache of pornographic material in a trunk in the basement.50 Although she 
disclaimed ownership of the trunk and its contents,51 Mapp was arrested, 
prosecuted, and found guilty of “knowingly having had in her possession 
and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and 
photographs” in violation of state law.52  
Despite the fact that it was nominally an obscenity case,53 Mapp’s 
lawyers emphasized the state’s intrusion into the private sphere.54 In 
overturning Mapp’s conviction, the Court seemed to agree that the police 
search had gone too far.55 Referencing Rochin, the Mapp Court articulated 
a “freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy” rooted in the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments.56   
                                                                                                                          
45 Id. at 165. 
46 Id. at 172.   
47 Id. at 173. 
48 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
49 Id. at 645. 
50 Id. at 645; see Transcript of Record at 22, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (No. 236) 
(containing Officer Delau’s testimony that his partner, Officer Dever, found a “foot locker” in the 
basement containing “policy paraphernalia”). 
51 Brief of Appellant on the Merits at 6, State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio 1960) (No. 236) 
[hereinafter Brief of Appellant]. 
52 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643. 
53 See Brief of Appellant on the Merits at 1, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (No. 236) (“The 
Appellant was convicted of the crime that she ‘unlawfully and knowingly had in her possession and 
under her control, certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures and photographs, being so indecent and 
immoral in their nature that the same would be offensive to the Court and improper to be placed on the 
records thereof’ . . . in violation of Sec. 2905.34, Ohio Revised Code.”). 
54 See id. at 18 (arguing that the officer’s conduct “portray[ed] a shocking disregard of human 
rights” and referencing the Rochin Court’s observations that “[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the 
petitioner . . . offends even hardened sensibilities” and “shock[s] the conscience”). 
55 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
56 Id. at 657. 
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Although Rochin and Mapp were principally concerned with 
procedural protections for criminal defendants, criminal law reformers57 
interested in substantive limits on the state’s use of the criminal law saw 
great promise in the Court’s assertion that “the security of one’s privacy 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police is implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”58 And indeed, they built upon the logic of these criminal 
procedure cases in their efforts to challenge morals legislation in the 
courts. 
III.  SEX, CRIME, AND BIRTH CONTROL:                                                  
LITIGATING A RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT 
As Part II detailed, the 1940s and 1950s witnessed the emergence of a 
robust debate about whether and how to draw limits on the state’s authority 
to criminalize private consensual sex between adults. This Part explores 
the connections between this criminal reform debate and the battle over 
access to contraception that led to 1965’s Griswold v. Connecticut. As it 
explains, in the period preceding Griswold, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) and birth control activists came together to harness the 
logic of the criminal reform effort—and the underlying interest in privacy 
as a bulwark against the state—in challenging prohibitions on 
contraception. In doing so, these groups crafted a more expansive vision of 
civil liberties—one that went beyond the traditional understanding of 
protections for First Amendment rights to encompass protections against 
state regulation of sexual morality, including bans on contraception. In this 
regard, Griswold, and the ongoing effort to invalidate Connecticut’s ban on 
contraception, was not simply about reproductive freedom and marital 
privacy; it was also about the larger question of constitutional protection 
against state encroachment into intimate life. 
The ACLU’s interest in privacy as a means of protecting civil liberties 
was evident in their litigation efforts in Rochin and Mapp.59 Critically, the 
ACLU’s emphasis on a right to privacy in these cases reflected a shift in 
the organization’s understanding of civil liberties. For much of its history, 
the ACLU had focused on bringing First Amendment challenges to 
censorship laws and laws prohibiting speech and the dissemination of 
                                                                                                                          
57 See infra Part III (discussing the ways in which reformers leveraged these decisions to 
challenge prohibitions on contraception). 
58 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
59 See Brief of Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 1, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165 (1952) (No. 83) (“We believe that California denied petitioner the minimum of respect for the 
dignity and privacy of the individual required by the democratic concept of the individual’s status in 
the State, and that his conviction was a violation of the due process of law guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”); Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Am. Civil Liberties Union and Ohio Civil Liberties 
Union at 11–16, State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio 1960) (No. 236) (arguing that the Ohio 
obscenity statute violated the constitutional right to privacy). 
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knowledge.60 Rochin and Mapp, however, reflected a more expansive view 
of civil liberties—one that went beyond the First Amendment and the 
dissemination of ideas to include limits on other exercises of state 
authority.   
The ACLU’s emphasis on privacy and limits on state authority was 
deeply informed by the “penal law reform movement that aimed to 
decriminalize sexual activities between consenting adults.”61 ACLU 
lawyers were aware of, and indeed, at times contributed to the ALI’s 
Model Penal Code project and its reform of sexual offenses.62 Sexologist 
Alfred Kinsey, who had been an early voice in the effort to liberalize the 
criminal regulation of private consensual sex, also served as a conduit for 
the exchange of ideas between the ACLU and the criminal law reform 
movement.63 Kinsey’s research routinely drew the attention of government 
officials. Accordingly, in a number of legal matters, including a federal 
obscenity challenge in United States v. 31 Photographs,64 ACLU lawyers 
Harriet Pilpel and Morris Ernst represented Kinsey against the 
government.65 Pilpel and Ernst came to agree with Kinsey that the 
criminalization of private, consensual sexual conduct allowed the state too 
much authority over intimate life, and in so doing, imposed severe 
constraints on individual rights and liberties.66  
The ACLU was not the only organization to view the criminal 
regulation of sex as an imposition on individual rights and liberties—or to 
borrow from the criminal law reform movement in challenging these laws. 
The birth control movement also began to perceive its mission to legalize 
contraception as part of a larger effort to preserve the exercise of individual 
rights and liberties against the state’s use of the criminal law. In a 1955 
advertisement, the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut (PPLC) 
expressed this sentiment in graphic detail. Calling attention to the state’s 
use of the criminal law to police contraceptive use, the advertisement 
warned, “[a] policeman in every home is the only way to enforce this 
law.”67 To visually impart the law’s intrusion into the lives of citizens, the 
                                                                                                                          
60 See WHEELER, supra note 19, at 93 (“By the 1940s, the ACLU had made a name for itself 
defending the First Amendment rights of birth control activists, authors, nudists, playwrights, and even 
consumers. With the exception of nudists, however—which remained a special but still peripheral issue 
for the ACLU—sexual conduct seemed another matter entirely.”). 
61 See id. at 103–04.  
62 See id. at 104–08 (discussing the cross-fertilization of ideas between the ACLU and the ALI). 
63 See id. at 105–07 (discussing Kinsey’s interactions with ACLU lawyers). 
64 156 F. Supp. 350, 352–53, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (holding that articles deemed obscene for use 
by the general public may be exempt from obscenity laws when used solely for bona fide scientific 
research). For a discussion of the case, see Kenneth R. Stevens, United States v. 31 Photographs: Dr. 
Alfred C. Kinsey and Obscenity Law, 71 IND. MAG. HIST. 299 (1975). 
65 See WHEELER, supra note 19, at 105. 
66 See id. at 105–07.  
67 Id. at 97–98 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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advertisement depicted police officers hiding under beds, eager to 
document conjugal activities.68 The advertisement was a chilling reminder 
to affluent women—who could obtain birth control easily from their 
physicians rather than relying on birth control clinics like their poorer 
sisters69—that Connecticut’s ban on contraceptive use nonetheless 
presented a serious imposition on their own rights and liberties. 
With their interests more closely aligned, the ACLU joined forces with 
the birth control movement to launch a challenge to Connecticut’s ban on 
contraceptive use.70 The ban was actually composed of two distinct 
criminal statutes. Initially passed in 1879, Section 53-3271 prohibited the 
“[u]se of drugs or instruments to prevent conception,” punishing violators 
with a fine of “not less than fifty dollars” and/or a term of imprisonment of 
“not less than sixty days nor more than one year.”72 Enforcement of the 
“use” statute was complemented by Section 54-196,73 Connecticut’s 
complicity statute, which provided that “[a]ny person who assists, abets, 
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may 
be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”74 The 
case, Poe v. Ullman,75 initially was brought by three Connecticut married 
couples and their doctor, C. Lee Buxton.76 According to the plaintiffs, the 
Connecticut contraceptive ban violated their due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.77 In making this claim, the appellants elaborated 
the privacy arguments glimpsed in Rochin and Mapp, contending that the 
Connecticut law posed a significant intrusion into intimate life.78 The 
argument sparked by the criminal law reform movement, and tested in the 
                                                                                                                          
68 See id. at 98 (providing a graphic of the advertisement). 
69 For a discussion of the socio-economic consequences of the contraception ban, see Cary 
Franklin, Griswold and the Public Dimension of the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J. F. 332 (2015); see 
also Brief for Planned Parenthood as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at *21, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (arguing that the Connecticut contraception ban was 
“grossly discriminatory,” because its “real impact is on those most in need of family planning service, 
i.e., the indigent and under-educated, whose medical help must come from public clinics”). 
70 GARROW, supra note 5, at 147–60 (discussing the circumstances leading to Poe v. Ullman). 
71 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958).  
72 Id. 
73 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (1958). 
74 Id. 
75 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
76 Id. at 498–500. Critically, the Poe lawyers also filed a companion case, Trubek v. Ullman, 367 
U.S. 907 (1961). Like Poe, Trubek was also dismissed without a ruling on the merits. See id.  For a 
discussion of Trubek, see Melissa Murray, Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold, 124 YALE 
L.J. F. 324 (2015). 
77 Brief for Appellants at 10, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (No. 60), 1960 WL 98679 at 
*10. 
78  See id. at *28 (“When the long arm of the law reaches into the bedroom and regulates the most 
sacred relations between a man and his wife, it is going too far. There must be a limit to the extent to 
which the moral scruples, of a substantial minority or, for that matter, of a majority, can be enacted into 
laws which regulate the private sex life of all married people.”). 
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context of procedural protections for criminal defendants, was now 
deployed to challenge a substantive criminal law. 
Ultimately, the Court dismissed Poe v. Ullman on jurisdictional 
grounds.79 Nevertheless, the privacy argument resonated with Associate 
Justices William O. Douglas and John Marshall Harlan. In considering the 
Connecticut ban, Douglas imagined a world where “full enforcement of the 
law . . . would reach the point where search warrants issued and officers 
appeared in bedrooms to find out what went on.”80 Such an invasion of 
“the innermost sanctum of the home,” in Douglas’s view, constituted “an 
invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free society.”81  
Although Harlan agreed that the Connecticut ban presented an 
imposition on privacy rights,82 his dissent also engaged the question of the 
state’s authority to legislate morality.83 Critically, Harlan did not dispute 
the state’s authority to legislate in order to promote its “people’s moral 
welfare,”84 including laws that prohibited “adultery, homosexuality, 
fornication and incest.”85 But the Connecticut ban, which “determined that 
the use of contraceptives is as iniquitous as any act of extra-marital sexual 
immorality” was “surely a very different thing indeed from punishing those 
who establish intimacies which the law has always forbidden and which 
can have no claim to social protection.”86 
In this way, both Douglas and Harlan echoed aspects of the broader 
criminal law reform debate that had raged over the last fifteen years. 
Should the state use the criminal law to police morality? And if the state 
could use the criminal law to police morals, how far could it go to do so? 
Did the Constitution impose any restraints on the exercise of state police 
power in intimate life? For Harlan, state regulation of sexual morality was 
                                                                                                                          
79 367 U.S. at 508 (“The fact that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this 
statute deprives these controversies of the immediacy which is an indispensable condition of 
constitutional adjudication. This Court cannot be umpire to debates concerning harmless, empty 
shadows.”). 
80 Id. at 519–20 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at 521. 
82  See id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting “the intrusion of the whole machinery of the 
criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy, requiring husband and wife to render account before 
a criminal tribunal of their uses of that intimacy . . . .”). 
83 See id. at 539 (“In reviewing state legislation, whether considered to be in the exercise of the 
State’s police powers, or in provision for the health, safety, morals or welfare of its people, it is clear 
that what is concerned are ‘the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.’ Only to the extent 
that the Constitution so requires may this Court interfere with the exercise of this plenary power of 
government.”) (internal citations omitted).  
84 Id. at 553. 
85 Id. at 552. Critically, Justice Harlan understood laws prohibiting adultery and homosexuality to 
“foster[] and protect[]” marriage by “regulat[ing] by means of the criminal law the details of that 
intimacy.” Id. at 553. 
86 Id.  
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permissible, but the state’s authority was not unfettered.87 The state could 
not go so far as to intrude upon an institution that the state valued, 
protected, and promoted, as it did marriage and the family.88 Although he 
did not endorse state regulation of adultery and fornication, Douglas also 
appeared convinced that state intervention into the home to police 
contraceptive use among married couples violated the Constitution.89   
Because it dismissed Poe v. Ullman on jurisdictional grounds,90 the 
Court did not have the opportunity to consider these questions against the 
backdrop of the federal Constitution. However, soon after the Court’s 
decision in Poe, the PPLC opened a birth control clinic in New Haven.91 
As expected, the birth control clinic drew law enforcement attention.92 
Soon after the clinic’s opening, its Executive Director, Estelle Griswold, 
and its physician, C. Lee Buxton, were arrested and charged under Sections 
53-32 and 54-196,93 setting the stage for Griswold v. Connecticut.94   
Like the plaintiffs in Poe v. Ullman, Griswold and Buxton emphasized 
a right to privacy as a limit on the state’s authority.95 Critically, however, 
Griswold, Buxton, and their amici proffered other arguments that, like the 
privacy argument, were rooted in the larger debate about criminal law 
reform and state enforcement of morals.96 In their brief, the appellants, 
                                                                                                                          
87 See id. at 552–53 (weighing the state’s interest in regulating morality against the individual’s 
right to privacy). 
88 See id. at 553 (“[T]he intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted 
feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but which 
always and in every age it has fostered and protected.”). 
89 See id. at 519–21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (contending that the contraceptive ban impermissibly 
intruded on the privacy of married couples). 
90 Id. at 508–09. 
91 See Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 936 (1990) (“The Planned Parenthood League of 
Connecticut opened a birth control clinic on November 1, 1961, at its Trumbull Street headquarters in 
New Haven.”). 
92 Id. at 936–37. 
93 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969) (“Any person who uses any drug, 
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than 
fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and 
imprisoned”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT § 54-196  (1958) (repealed 1969) (“Any person who assists, 
abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and 
punished as if he were the principal offender). 
94 Dudziak, supra note 91, at 937. 
95 Brief for Appellants at 67, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (“[W]e 
simply note, as one of the major costs that must be weighed against any possible gain, the unparalleled 
invasion of privacy which the law and its enforcement would entail.”). 
96 For example, the appellants’ brief in Griswold discussed at great length whether the 
Connecticut statutes were an accurate expression of majoritarian sexual values, and if so, whether they 
were an appropriate use of the state’s police power. See id. at 35–37, 48–49 (“The objective of the 
Connecticut statues—according to the premise we are now indulging—is to promote public morality by 
making it a criminal offense to prevent conception by some of the methods set forth above, but not 
others. . . . [T]he precise issue is whether the prohibition of those methods selected by the Connecticut 
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represented by Yale Law professor Thomas Emerson and Connecticut civil 
rights lawyer Catherine Roraback, with assistance from the ACLU and the 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA),97 went beyond privacy 
to explain that morals legislation, like the Connecticut laws at issue, were 
prone to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.98 The concern with 
selective and discriminatory enforcement was one that figured prominently 
in the ALI’s efforts to reform sexual offenses in the MPC.99 Indeed, 
Emerson and Roraback seemed to be parroting the MPC’s concerns about 
the abuse of sexual offenses laws when they noted that the challenged 
Connecticut statutes could be used “for blackmail, or for paying off a 
grudge, or for harassment of an unpopular citizen. It is not capable of 
rational administration.”100   
In addition to concerns about arbitrary enforcement, Emerson and 
Roraback argued that the challenged Connecticut statutes had the perverse 
effect of encouraging other criminal behavior. As they explained in their 
brief on behalf of Griswold and Buxton, “[t]he statutes tend to produce an 
increase in the number of illegal abortions.”101 In its amicus brief, the 
PPFA elaborated this concern about cultivating other criminal behavior by 
reviving an argument first ventilated in Poe v. Ullman.102 In Poe, the 
appellants argued that because Connecticut prohibited married couples 
                                                                                                                          
legislature, viewed as a regulation to promote the public morality, conforms to the standard of due 
process of law. . . . Certainly the court cannot take the position that the simple claim of a moral aim by 
the legislature satisfies the requirements of due process. . . . It would allow the legislature to impose 
restraints upon individual liberties solely on the ground that some insignificant fraction of the 
community regarded the issue as a moral one. . . . Our concern here is with the current views of the 
community as to the moral basis for prohibiting the use of extrinsic aids in avoiding conception. . . . We 
submit that the overwhelming opinion of today does not regard the use of extrinsic aids by married 
couples in avoiding conception as morally reprehensible, or at least does not regard the use of such aids 
by other persons as affording moral grounds for absolute prohibition by government decree.”).     
97 Both the ACLU and the PPFA filed amicus briefs in support of Griswold and Buxton. See Brief 
for Am. Civil Liberties Union and the Conn. Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 3, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496); Brief and Appendices for Planned Parenthood Fed’n of 
Am. as Amici Curiae, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496). 
98 See Brief for Appellants at 70–71, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496)  
(“The Connecticut statutes operate in an irrational manner in . . . important respects. . . . The 
statutes . . . would always be applicable to married persons and seldom applicable to unmarried persons 
engaging in sexual relations. . . . The statutes operate to discriminate against low-income groups. . . . 
Since the statutes are not generally enforced or enforceable, they can only be applied to individuals in 
an arbitrary fashion.”). 
99 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207 comments on sexual offenses, at 12 (Council Draft No. 8, 1955) 
(“There is some indication that these laws, like other dead letter statutes, may lend themselves to 
discriminatory enforcement . . . .”). 
100 Brief for Appellants at 71–72, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496). 
101 Id. 
102 See Brief and Appendices for Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. as Amici Curiae at 10, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (“The consequences of the human sexual 
drive are made clear also in the research findings that there are an estimated 1,000,000 unlawful 
abortions in the United States each year . . . and in other social problems too numerous to detail.”). 
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from using contraception, abstinence was the only means available to 
avoid pregnancy. As an alternative to contraception for married couples, 
abstinence, the Poe appellants maintained, was unrealistic and 
undesirable.103 Abstinence, they argued, required suppressing a natural 
sexual urge that, by law, could only be expressed in marriage:  “To 
demand prolonged continence as the only method of contraception from 
anyone who is not stoutly bulwarked by the strongest spiritual sanction is 
to drive that individual to what society has judged criminal.”104 
In its amicus brief in Griswold, the PPFA reiterated these connections 
between abstinence and criminal sex. In a lengthy appendix, the PPFA 
cited numerous scholars, all of whom were skeptical of abstinence as a 
plausible alternative to contraception.105 According to one scholar, 
abstinence could be successful only “[i]f men were angels.”106 More often, 
abstinence resulted in physiological and psychological anxieties that could 
render both spouses susceptible “to outside sex temptations.”107 Indeed, 
one scholar blamed abstinence for “driving the husband into the arms of 
prostitutes,”108 while another scholar mused that the unavailability of 
contraception (and the concomitant reliance on abstinence as a method of 
family planning) was directly correlated with the increased incidence of 
illegal abortions.109   
Importantly, all of these arguments had been raised earlier in Poe and 
in the criminal law reform debate. As the criminal law reformers 
explained, the state could not justify the criminal regulation of sex and 
sexuality on the ground that doing so promoted morals and the public 
welfare, if in fact such laws actually prompted more offensive conduct. 
Likewise, the Poe and Griswold appellants relied on these arguments to 
cast doubt on the efficacy of the state’s justifications for the contraceptive 
ban. How could this imposition on individual liberty be justified if criminal 
bans on contraception actually encouraged more pernicious forms of 
sexual immorality that undermined marriage and the marital family?   
                                                                                                                          
103 See id. at 13 (“So far as abstinence is concerned, as a limitation of births, it should be enough 
to state that it is common knowledge that for all societies in all ages, it has not worked . . . .”); Brief 
and Appendices of Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. as Amicus Curiae, at 9–10, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (“[F]or most humans [abstinence] does not work.”). 
104 Id. at 30–31 (internal citations omitted). 
105 See id. app. at 39b–48b (compiling numerous quotations from medical authorities on the topic 
of abstinence as an alternative to contraception).  
106 Id. app. at 45b (quoting J. Whitridge Williams, Indications for Therapeutic Sterilization in 
Obstetrics, 91 JAMA 1239, 1241 (1928)).  
107 Id. app. at 47b (quoting LORD DAWSON, MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACEPTION 175 (1927)). 
108 Id. app. at  44b–45b (quoting WILLIAM J. ROBINSON, FEWER AND BETTER BABIES: BIRTH 
CONTROL OR THE LIMITATION OF OFFSPRING BY  PREVENCEPTION 36–38 (46th ed. 1931)). 
109 See id. at 10 (“The consequences of the human sexual drive are made clear also in the research 
findings that there are an estimated 1,000,000 unlawful abortions in the United States each year . . . .” 
(citing MARY CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 180 (1958))). 
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These arguments, which situated the contraceptive ban within the 
broader criminal law reform debate, were aired in the briefs, but they never 
eclipsed the privacy argument in the Griswold Court’s decision-making.110 
Although the Court invalidated the Connecticut ban, its analysis focused 
on a right to privacy that inhered in the marital relationship.111 On this 
account, the Connecticut ban was offensive not because it relied on the 
criminal law to demand conformity with particular sexual mores, but 
because it “operate[d] directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife 
and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”112 
Still, shades of the broader criminal law reform concerns could be 
glimpsed in Griswold. Toward the opinion’s conclusion, Justice Douglas 
gestured toward the criminal reform debate, musing “[w]ould we allow the 
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs 
of the use of contraceptives?”113 “The very idea [wa]s repulsive.”114 But 
critically, the revulsion that the prospect of jackbooted police officers 
hiding under beds produced was not framed as a broad concern about the 
prospect of unfettered state authority in the lives of citizens. Instead, any 
limits on state power were expressly tethered to “the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marital relationship.”115 With marriage and the marital 
couple in the foreground, more general concerns about limiting state 
authority and reforming the criminal law slipped beneath Griswold’s 
surface.   
IV.  RECOVERING GRISWOLD’S CRIMINAL LAW 
When Griswold was litigated, there was no mistaking its criminal 
posture. Newspaper accounts referred to the criminal prosecution and the 
resulting fines that Griswold and Buxton paid as a result of their 
convictions.116 The media also noted that the Connecticut statutes 
                                                                                                                          
110 At oral argument, the justices focused on the privacy argument and a latent equal protection 
argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2–3, 6–8, 10–12, 17, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (No. 496). There was no discussion of the criminal law reform debate. Id. 
111 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the 
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, 
in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve 
its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.” (emphasis added)). 
112 Id. at 482. 
113 Id. at 486. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 486. 
116 See Free Speech Argued in Birth Clinic Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1961 (referring to Griswold 
and Buxton as “defendants” and noting that the pair “ha[d] pleaded not guilty of charges of being an 
accessory to the use of contraceptives”) (internal quotation marks omitted); New Haven Police Shut 
Birth Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1961 (noting that Griswold and Buxton were “arrested” and 
“released in $100 cash bond”); Richard H. Parke, 2 Deny Violating Birth-Clinic Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
25, 1961 (discussing Griswold and Buxton’s arrests and arraignments).  
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presented classic criminal law issues regarding the likelihood of 
enforcement.117 Likewise, the litigation materials referred to the litigants as 
“defendants” and described the arraignment, trial, sanctions, and 
subsequent appeals in detail.118 Yet, despite these acknowledgments of the 
case’s criminal law provenance, we more often think of Griswold as a 
constitutional law case,119 a reproductive rights case,120 or even as a family 
law case.121 It is rarely characterized as a criminal law case.122   
This is perhaps surprising. When Griswold was announced, many 
scholars and advocates assumed that the decision would underwrite a 
broader campaign to scale back the criminal regulation of sex and 
sexuality, particularly laws prohibiting homosexual sodomy and 
fornication.123 Indeed, in Griswold’s wake, there were a number of 
challenges to state laws prohibiting sodomy and fornication. In Smayda v. 
United States,124 two men charged with engaging in homosexual acts in a 
public restroom relied on Griswold to challenge clandestine police 
                                                                                                                          
117 See Richard H. Parke, Birth Clinic Tests Connecticut Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1961 (quoting 
Fowler V. Harper, a Yale Law professor and one of the attorneys in the Poe litigation, as saying “I 
think citizens and doctors alike are entitled to know if they are violating the law” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
118 See Brief for Appellee at 1–2, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) 
(discussing, in the context of appellee’s jurisdictional statement, the issuing of warrants, as well as the 
subsequent arrests and arraignments of Griswold and Buxton); Brief for Appellants at 2, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (discussing, in the context of appellants’ jurisdictional 
statement, the arrests, arraignments, and criminal trial of Griswold and Buxton).  
119 Griswold is a staple in Constitutional Law casebooks. E.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 331 (6th ed. 2014); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
970 (4th ed. 2013).  
120 Griswold is often presented as a core part of the reproductive rights canon. E.g., MELISSA 
MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE 536 
(2014).  
121 Griswold is often featured in family law casebooks. E.g., AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 255 (6th ed. 2012); KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (4th ed. 2010). 
122 None of the leading criminal law casebooks excerpts Griswold. E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & 
STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed. 2012); SANFORD KADISH ET 
AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2012); JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2008). Notably, one casebook does discuss Griswold 
in a footnote to Bowers v. Hardwick. See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 578 n.a (2005).   
123 Indeed, in 1967, just two years after Griswold was announced, the ACLU issued a national 
policy statement asserting that the criminalization of private, consensual sexual activities between 
adults, constituted an impermissible infringement on the fundamental right to privacy. See JOHN 
D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 213 (1983). Litigators also took note of the 
perceived vulnerability of sodomy statutes, relying on Griswold to challenge such laws in a number of 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. 
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969); Palmer v. Jones, 
296 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ind. 1969); State v. Rheinhart, 424 P.2d 906 (Wash. 1967), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 832 (1967); People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865 (1970).   
124 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965). 
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surveillance practices. In this context, Griswold proved unavailing. 
Although the Ninth Circuit was “as uncomfortable as the next man by the 
thought that our own legitimate activities in such a place may be spied 
upon by the police,” it nonetheless held that “the right of the public to 
expect that the police will put a stop to its use as a resort for crime all join 
to require a reasonable limitation upon the right of privacy involved.”125 
Similarly, in Buchanan v. Batchelor,126 a litigant relied on Griswold to 
challenge a Texas ban on sodomy. There, the Northern District of Texas 
concluded that Griswold protected acts of sodomy between married 
couples, but avoided the question of whether Griswold’s protections 
extended to homosexual sodomy.127   
Instead, Griswold fueled the expansion of reproductive rights and 
autonomy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, Griswold’s articulation of a right to 
privacy was elaborated to permit unmarried persons access to 
contraception.128 In 1973, Roe v. Wade concluded that the right of privacy 
was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.”129  
Griswold’s focus on marriage, the marital couple, and the home may 
help explain why its logic never achieved much traction in the broader 
debate over the criminal regulation of sex and sexuality, and why its roots 
in the larger criminal law reform debate remain obscured today. Although 
the majority acknowledged Griswold’s criminal character, it did not 
directly confront or reference the underlying debate over criminal law 
reform and liberalization. Instead, the Griswold majority devoted most of 
its attention to tethering the newly articulated right to privacy to marriage 
and the marital couple.130 As the right to privacy became inextricably 
bound to marriage, it became unmoored from the broader conversation 
about the criminal regulation of morals.   
Griswold’s association with marriage and “a fundamental individual 
right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child,” rather than a 
broader notion of sexual liberty and restraint on state authority, was 
evident in the Court’s discussion in Bowers v. Hardwick, a 1986 challenge 
                                                                                                                          
125 Id. at 257. 
126 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
127 Id. at 733 (concluding that traditional moral disapproval of sodomy was “not sufficient reason 
for the State to encroach upon the liberty of married persons in their private conduct”); see also Cotner 
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1968) (concluding, in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, 
that a statute punishing acts of sodomy between married persons might well be unconstitutional after 
Griswold); Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975) (refusing to extend 
Griswold’s protections to same-sex sodomy). 
128 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
129 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
130 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497, 485–86 (1965) (explaining that marriage is “a 
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees” 
and is protected by “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”).  
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to a Georgia sodomy prohibition.131 Although Michael Hardwick claimed 
that Griswold and its progeny conferred a right to engage in private 
consensual same-sex sodomy, the Bowers majority disagreed.132 As the 
Court explained, there was “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or 
procreation . . . and homosexual activity.”133 Moreover, “any claim that 
[Griswold and its progeny] nevertheless stand for the proposition that any 
kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is 
constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.”134  
In this way, the Griswold decision, with its concern for the “sacred 
precincts of [the] marital bedroom”135 transformed the case from one about 
limits on state intervention in intimate life into one that was almost 
exclusively about preventing state interference with marriage and 
procreation. Indeed, it was this more limited framing that allowed 
Griswold, and its articulation of a protected zone of privacy, to coexist 
alongside Bowers’ repudiation of that zone for those deemed ineligible for 
marriage and incompatible with procreation. 
It would take almost forty years for the criminal law reform concerns 
subordinated in Griswold to come to the fore in the Court’s jurisprudence 
and its conception of the right to privacy. In 2003’s Lawrence v. Texas,136 
the Court confronted a challenge to a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex 
sodomy. The case, like Griswold before it, prompted arguments debating 
the state’s use of the criminal law to police and enforce traditional sexual 
mores.   
In the briefs, the litigants and their amici proffered arguments that 
directly referenced the MPC, the Hart-Devlin debates, and the years-earlier 
debate over criminal law reform.137 Advocates for the state of Texas 
emphasized the long-standing support for the state’s authority to regulate 
                                                                                                                          
131 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
132 See id. at 189–90 (“We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with 
[Hardwick] that the Court’s prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a right of privacy that 
extends to homosexual sodomy. . . .”). 
133 Id. at 191. 
134 Id. 
135 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
136 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
137 See, e.g., Brief of the CATO Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152342, at *16 (“Popular support for the 
consensual sodomy laws was also waning. Between 1969 and 1976, eighteen states decriminalized 
consensual sodomy, consistent with the ALI’s Model Penal Code (“MPC”).”); Brief of Petitioners at 6, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152352, at *6 (“The Homosexual 
Conduct Law was substituted for a facially nondiscriminatory law at a time when many States, 
prompted by changing views about the proper limits of government power that were reflected in the 
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, were revising their criminal codes and completely 
abandoning offenses like fornication and sodomy.”).  
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public morality.138 As they explained, morals offenses, like the challenged 
sodomy ban, were rarely prosecuted.139 On this account, the law was not an 
impermissible intrusion into intimate life; rather, it simply served to 
express a societal consensus regarding normative sex and sexuality.140 
Predictably, the petitioners and their amici underscored the right to 
privacy as a limit on state interference in intimate life; however, in so 
doing, they decoupled the right to privacy from Griswold’s emphasis on 
marriage and the marital couple. According to the petitioners, “the 
Constitution imposes substantive limits on the power of government to 
compel, forbid, or regulate the intimate details of private sexual relations 
between two consenting adults.”141 Privacy’s protections, they insisted, did 
not begin and end at the altar: “Since Griswold, the Court has recognized 
that all adults, regardless of marital status or other facets of their 
relationship, have the same interest in making their own intimate choices 
in” the area of sex and relationships.142  
But even as the petitioners and their amici emphasized privacy as a 
protection for private, consensual adult sex and sexuality, they also raised 
other arguments that recalled the earlier criminal law reform debate. As an 
initial matter, they noted that, as a result of the MPC and the broader law 
reform debate, most laws legislating traditional sexual mores had been 
repealed by judicial or legislative fiat.143 The persistence of sodomy bans 
therefore reflected impermissible anti-gay animus, rather than an 
appropriate exercise of state police power.144 Further, even if rarely 
prosecuted, criminal sodomy laws raised concerns about discriminatory 
enforcement, as well as concerns about the collateral civil consequences of 
criminal convictions.145 Meaningfully, both of these issues—discriminatory 
enforcement and collateral civil consequences—had surfaced years earlier 
in the ALI debates over the MPC, as well as in the larger discussion of 
criminal law reform.146   
                                                                                                                          
138 Respondent’s Brief at 42, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 
470184, at *42 (“The promotion of morality has long been recognized as a lawful function of 
government.”). 
139 Id. at *48 (maintaining that the application of sodomy statutes “is not common”). 
140 Id. (“[T]he statutes . . . express a baseline standard expressing the core moral beliefs of the 
people of the State.”). 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at *12. 
143 Id. at *22 (canvassing these trends and noting that “bans on private sexual conduct between 
consenting adults have been rejected in contemporary times”). 
144 See id. at *4–6 (arguing that the challenged sodomy ban discriminated against gay men and 
women by criminalizing “non-commercial, consensual, private sexual conduct” that would otherwise 
be lawful if performed by “heterosexual adult couples, married or unmarried” ). 
145 See, e.g., id. at *27–29 (describing the various civil consequences arising from criminal 
convictions due to homosexual conduct). 
146 See supra Part II (detailing the earlier effort to modernize and reform the criminal law and 
limit the state’s ability to regulate intimate life). 
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In invalidating the Texas anti-sodomy statute, the Lawrence majority 
appeared to expand Griswold’s notion of marital privacy to include adult 
relationships, whether married or not.147 But critically, in overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick,148 the 1986 decision upholding a similar sodomy 
statute, the majority went beyond Griswold to explicitly delineate limits on 
the state’s use of criminal law as a means of policing sex and enforcing 
morals.149 In upholding Georgia’s criminal ban on sodomy, the Bowers 
Court made clear that the state could use the criminal law for the 
preservation and enforcement of majoritarian sexual mores. As the Bowers 
Court explained, “[t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, 
and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated 
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”150 By 
contrast, in concluding that Bowers “should be and now is overruled,”151 
the Lawrence majority framed the issue as “whether the majority may use 
the power of the State to enforce [majoritarian sexual mores] on the whole 
society through operation of the criminal law.”152   
For the Lawrence majority, that issue seemed well-settled. According 
to the majority, socio-legal developments over “the past half century” 
reflected “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”153 As evidence of this “emerging awareness,” the 
majority cited, among other developments, the MPC, which “made clear 
that it did not recommend or provide for ‘criminal penalties for consensual 
sexual relations conducted in private.’”154  
As importantly, both the majority and concurring opinions in 
Lawrence expressed concern for the collateral civil consequences of 
criminal laws—even if those laws went unenforced. According to the 
majority, “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
                                                                                                                          
147 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. Lawrence’s effort to expand Griswoldian privacy to unmarried 
couples built upon 1972’s Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute 
that prohibited contraceptive use among unmarried persons. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 
(1972). Critically, the Eisenstadt Court decided the issue on Equal Protection grounds, concluding that 
there was no rational justification for permitting contraceptive use among married couples, while 
prohibiting the unmarried from doing so. Id. at 453–55. Referencing both Griswold and Eisenstadt, 
Lawrence invalidated the anti-sodomy statute at issue on liberty grounds, concluding that the right to 
privacy allowed unmarried adult couples the right to engage in private, consensual sex. Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 558, 562, 564–65, 578–79.  
148 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
149 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
150 Id. at 196. 
151 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
152 Id. at 571. 
153 Id. at 571–72. 
154 Id. at 572 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)). 
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persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”155 
In her concurrence to the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor elaborated 
the point. Although sodomy prosecutions were rare, “[t]his case 
shows . . . that [they] . . . do occur.”156 In addition to the stigma of being 
labeled convicted criminals, those convicted under criminal sodomy bans 
could encounter other long-standing impediments in their daily lives, 
including restrictions “in the areas of employment, family issues, and 
housing.”157   
It was not just the majority and concurring opinions that framed 
Lawrence as a case about limits on the state’s use of criminal law as a 
mechanism for enforcing majoritarian sexual mores. In a stinging dissent, 
Justice Scalia criticized the majority opinion on the ground that it licensed 
the decriminalization of a wide range of extant sexual offenses, all of 
which previously had been justified by the state’s authority to police and 
enforce morals.158 In Lawrence’s wake, Justice Scalia predicted that 
“[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” would be 
“called into question.”159 With its decision, Justice Scalia warned, “the 
Court has taken sides in the culture war.”160 Although Justice Scalia 
imagined this culture war to be confined to attitudes regarding 
homosexuality,161 in truth, the culture war he imagined actually was part of 
the larger debate about the state’s efforts to police morality and enforce 
sexual conformity in intimate life. In other words, it was part of the very 
same culture war that had raged since the 1950s. 
In this way, Lawrence was the apotheosis of the criminal law reform 
effort that anticipated (and helped produce) Griswold. Unlike Griswold, 
which avoided directly engaging the question of legal reform of laws 
regulating sex and sexuality more generally, Lawrence squarely confronted 
this issue and determined that state criminal regulation of private, 
consensual sex was inappropriate. With this in mind, it is unsurprising that 
today, Lawrence is not known simply as a sexuality case, but also as a 
                                                                                                                          
155 Id. at 575.  
156 Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
157 Id. at 582 (citing State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992)). 
158 Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have 
relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is 
‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation.”). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 602. 
161 In an earlier case concerning the civil rights of LGBT people, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), Justice Scalia dissented, opining that the majority “ha[d] mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of 
spite.” Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On this account, in invalidating a Colorado referendum that 
severely curtailed civil protections against sexual orientation discrimination, the majority, in Justice 
Scalia’s view, had “mistaken” a genuine (and legitimate) struggle over the meaning and application of 
public morals for base animus and rancor against LGBT persons. Id.  
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criminal law case162—one that endorses John Stuart Mill’s view that the 
state may only limit the actions of individuals when doing so would 
prevent harm to others.163 Under this logic, the preservation and 
enforcement of public morals would no longer suffice as a justification for 
the state’s use of the criminal law to police intimate life. As such, 
Lawrence was not merely a decision that invalidated sodomy laws; it 
constitutionalized a consensus about limits on state authority to regulate 
intimate life that had first surfaced in the criminal law reform debate of the 
1950s. 
V.   RECLAIMING HISTORY AND ENFORCING MORALITY  
As the preceding Parts make clear, Griswold, Lawrence, and the line of 
cases articulating a right to privacy are rooted in the debate over criminal 
law reform that arose in the 1950s. Although the Court’s decision in 
Lawrence explicitly drew upon these roots, Griswold’s relationship to this 
debate and the issues it surfaced has been less studied and explored.    
But there is much to be gained from reflecting on the criminal law 
reform debate, and its connections to Griswold and the birth of a 
constitutionally-protected right to privacy. Recovering Griswold’s criminal 
law antecedents provides a more complete historical narrative for 
understanding the case and assessing its impact on the development of the 
right to privacy. A more accurate historical narrative not only makes clear 
that Griswold is not exclusively about reproductive rights; it reminds us 
that the interest in state control over reproduction was not—and does not 
have to be—exclusively about the rights of privileged women. In this 
regard, this history extends Griswold’s scope beyond reproductive rights to 
include a larger discussion about the state’s authority to impose sexual 
values and mores on all of its citizens. 
As importantly, focusing on this aspect of Griswold’s history may also 
help surface contemporary challenges to the rights and liberties of 
citizens—challenges that have gone largely unnoticed. The criminal law 
reform debate of the 1950s focused on the state’s use of the criminal law to 
police morality because the criminal law was the primary means by which 
                                                                                                                          
162 Lawrence is featured in a number of leading criminal law casebooks. See, e.g., BONNIE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 2004) (excerpting Lawrence); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS PROCESSES 121 (8th ed. 2007) (excerpting Lawrence); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 281 (9th ed. 2012) (discussing Lawrence); CYNTHIA 
LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 589 (1st ed. 2005) (excerpting 
Lawrence); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE REGULATION 
OF VICE 138 (2007) (excerpting Lawrence). 
163 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) (“[T]he sole end for which mankind is warranted . . . 
in interfering with the liberty action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others.”). 
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the state marked and punished non-normative sex and sexuality. But even 
as reformers focused on criminal law as the predominant engine of sexual 
regulation, they made clear that their concerns were more generally 
directed toward the exercise of state power in the lives of individual 
citizens.164 
Today, in the wake of Griswold, Lawrence, and the decriminalization 
effort they reflect, criminal law does not pack the same punch as it did a 
generation ago. But just because the criminal law regime of sexual 
regulation has been (largely) dismantled does not mean that the state has 
completely divested its interests in regulating sexual morality. Although it 
has gone largely unremarked upon, for many years, a parallel civil regime 
of sexual regulation existed alongside the criminal regime.165 And, as 
Justice O’Connor observed in her concurrence in Lawrence, this system of 
civil regulation frequently was exercised with reference to the extant (but 
often unenforced) system of criminal regulation.166 For example,167 a police 
officer could be fired from his job for having an extramarital affair.168 
Under the police department’s administrative code of conduct, the 
offending conduct would be charged under a provision prohibiting 
“conduct unbecoming an officer.”169 Critically, however, these 
administrative disciplinary charges were predicated on the fact that the 
underlying conduct was not just “unbecoming,” but actually a criminal 
act.170 As one court noted, “a[n administrative] rule prohibiting the 
commission of [a] crime” was a sensible measure that a jurisdiction could 
take to ensure that an officer did not engage in conduct that would 
“diminish his respect in the eyes of the community, arouse cynicism, 
discourage public cooperation, and perhaps encourage crime by others.”171 
Today, in our post-Lawrence world, the regime of criminal sexual 
regulation does not exist to provide a predicate for civil sexual 
                                                                                                                          
164 See supra text accompanying notes 20–43 (describing the reform movement’s interest in 
limiting the state’s authority to intrude into the intimate lives of individuals). 
165 See Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: Lawrence v. Texas and the Evolution of Sexual 
Regulation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing this parallel regime of civil sexual 
regulation). 
166 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Texas’ invocation 
of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize 
homosexual sodomy . . . . [T]he law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval . . . than as a 
tool to stop criminal behavior.”); see also Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165 (“[C]ivil state 
regulation of sex and sexuality often occurred in the shadow of extant criminal laws . . . these criminal 
laws were never enforced . . . .”). 
167 Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165. 
168 See, e.g., Andrade v. City of Phx., 692 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1982). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 559.  
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regulation.172 Instead, these civil means of regulating sex and enforcing 
morality exist—and are exercised—independent of any criminal law 
antecedent.173 And critically, these civil means of state regulation of sex 
and sexuality may communicate moral disapprobation and compel 
conformity with sexual norms as effectively as their criminal law 
counterparts.174   
Consider the facts of Anderson v. City of Lavergne.175 There, a police 
officer began a romantic relationship with an administrative assistant in his 
unit.176 A supervisor, professing an interest in avoiding sexual harassment 
claims, ordered the couple to “‘cease all contact with each other’ outside of 
the workplace.”177 When they refused, the officer was terminated for 
failing to follow a superior’s order—a violation of the department’s code 
of conduct.178 The officer filed suit challenging his termination, and at trial 
he was awarded damages; however, on appeal, the court ruled in favor of 
the City.179 Although the appellate court acknowledged constitutional 
protections for association and privacy, and suggested that these 
protections extended to “nonmarital romantic relationships,”180 it 
determined that the supervisor’s order—and the policy prohibiting inter-
office relationships that animated it—did not constitute a “direct and 
substantial interference” with the officer’s “intimate associations.”181 The 
officer “continued to enjoy the ability to form intimate associations with 
anyone other than fellow police department employees of differing 
rank.”182 Reviewing the order and policy under rational basis review, the 
appellate court determined that the policy was rationally related to the 
city’s professed interest in avoiding sexual harassment suits.183 
Likewise, in Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City,184 a police department 
reprimanded a female police officer for her off-duty sexual conduct. The 
officer, who was separated from her husband, had engaged in extramarital 
sex with an officer from a neighboring jurisdiction while attending an out-
                                                                                                                          
172 See Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165 (noting that criminal law has receded as an 
agent of sexual regulation, and in so doing, has eliminated the criminal predicate on which the parallel 
system of civil regulation once depended). 
173 See Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165 (arguing that in the absence of criminal 
law, civil modalities continue to intervene into intimate life to regulate sex and sexuality). 
174 See id. (noting that, even after Lawrence, the state continues to use law to demand compliance 
with majoritarian sexual norms and mores). 
175 371 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2004). 
176 Id. at 880. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 880–83. 




184 528 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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of-town training session.185 The officer challenged the department’s actions 
on the ground that they violated her right to privacy.186 At trial and on 
appeal, the officer lost.187 The Tenth Circuit interpreted Lawrence 
narrowly, concluding that it did not confer a broadly defined fundamental 
“right to private sexual activity.”188 According to the court, the 
department’s sanction of private, consensual sex was a reasonable effort to 
“further internal discipline [and] the public’s respect for its police officers 
and the department they represent.”189  
Together, Anderson and Seegmiller reveal the flaw in Griswold’s (and 
Lawrence’s) progress narrative. As the facts of Griswold and Lawrence 
make clear, the burdens of criminalization often are highly visible and 
obviously recognizable190—an arrest, a criminal conviction, incarceration, 
police surveillance, and, as the mid-century reformers noted, the 
unwelcomed presence of the police officer under the bed.191 In this regard, 
it is unsurprising that the initial efforts to draw limits on the state’s ability 
to regulate sex and sexuality focused on these very visible forms of state 
interference.   
Griswold and its progeny are testament to the reform movement’s 
success in limiting the state’s visible presence in intimate life. When we 
assess the trajectory from Griswold to Lawrence, it is clear that the right to 
privacy has become entrenched,192 and in so doing, has sequestered the 
most intimate aspects of our quotidian lives from state intrusion.  
But even as the right to privacy has become entrenched as a 
constitutional norm, Griswold and its articulation of the right to privacy 
was never closely associated with the broader effort to limit the state’s use 
of the criminal law as a means of regulating intimate life. Instead, 
Griswold, and the right it introduced, has come to represent a profound 
shift in social and cultural values regarding sex.193  
Prior to Griswold, sex was confined to marriage, and marriage was 
                                                                                                                          
185 Id. at 765. 
186 Id. at 766. 
187 Id. at 764. 
188 Id. at 770–71. 
189 Id. at 772. 
190 George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 287 
(1998) (describing the application of criminal law and the punishment that flows from it as “the most 
elementary and obvious expression of the state’s sovereign power” over the individual). 
191 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
192 See Reva B. Siegel, How Conflict Entrenched the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J. F. 316, 319–
21 (2015) (discussing the entrenchment of Griswold and the right to privacy). 
193 Michael Compitello, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in the Battle 
Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 159 (1997) (“There is no doubt that Griswold was part of 
an overall sexual revolution that was occurring in America and that its effects in protecting the privacy 
of the marriage relationship extended not just to the family in general, but far beyond.”). 
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understood as a procreative, heterosexual institution.194 In rejecting this 
vision (and increasing access to contraception), Griswold has been 
understood as fueling the Sexual Revolution and a more permissive and 
individualized sexual culture. On this account, Griswold is credited with 
helping to transform society from one in which the state demanded 
compliance with majoritarian sexual norms to one in which the state 
respected some degree of sexual autonomy.195  
Today, Griswold’s achievement is facilitating this profound change in 
social values, rather than in limiting state authority. This perception of 
Griswold, as much as the decision’s emphasis on marriage and the marital 
couple, helps to explain why its role in the criminal law reform debate has 
been obscured. In venerating Griswold’s role in transforming our culture, 
we have overlooked its place in the effort to design limitations on the state.   
Cases like Seegmiller and Anderson suggest the consequences of this 
neglect. Because we have overlooked Griswold’s role in articulating limits 
on the state’s regulatory authority, we have failed to think seriously about 
all of the ways in which the state may curtail or impede the exercise of 
individual autonomy in intimate life. Although Griswold and Lawrence 
draw attention to the state’s use of criminal law to limit the exercise of 
individual autonomy, cases like Seegmiller and Anderson suggest that state 
interference in intimate life may take other forms.  
In this regard, focusing on Griswold’s relationship to the criminal law 
is important not because criminal law is categorically distinct from other 
forms of state regulation, but because, as perhaps the most visible and 
obvious form of state authority, criminal law draws our attention to the 
state itself. In reminding us of the state’s thick role in shaping and 
enforcing sexual norms, Griswold’s criminal law helps to illuminate and 
contextualize the subtler, non-criminal forms of state sexual regulation that 
have survived Griswold and Lawrence.  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
194 Murray, Strange Bedfellows, supra note 11, at 1265 (“Until the twentieth century, [procedural 
rules and restrictions on entry into marriage] made clear that marriage was an intraracial, monogamous, 
exogamous, and heterosexual union between consenting adults.”). 
195 See Robert A. Sedler, Abortion, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Constitution: The View 
From Without and Within, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 529, 531 (1998) (arguing that 
the sexual revolution of the 1960s was “facilitated by the Supreme Court’s recognition of a so-called 
constitutional ‘right of privacy’ in Griswold v. Connecticut”); George Weigel, The Sixties, Again and 
Again, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 2008, at 22, http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/03/004-the-sixties-
again-and-again-36 (arguing that in Griswold, “the Supreme Court began to set in legal concrete the 
notion that sexual morals and patterns of family life are matters of private choice or taste, not matters of 
public concern in which the state has a legitimate interest”). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
As we reflect on Griswold’s legacy, it is worth remembering that 
Griswold was not solely about married couples’ access to birth control. 
Instead, it was also part of a larger effort to think about the law’s place in 
regulating intimate life. With this in mind, our approach to this storied 
anniversary is perhaps more muted when we consider Griswold’s criminal 
law antecedents and the decision’s underlying conservatism. By 
recuperating the debate over criminal law reform, and Griswold’s place in 
it, we also recover the fundamental question at the heart of that debate—
and at the heart Griswold: whether the state may use its authority to 
censure and condemn private, consensual adult sex and sexuality?   
When we focus on that question, it becomes clear that although much 
has been achieved since Griswold, the effort to reform the relationship 
between state regulation and individual liberty remains incomplete. 
Although Griswold and Lawrence succeeded in flushing the police from 
our bedrooms, the state remains a persistent presence in intimate life. In 
this regard, recovering Griswold’s criminal law suggests how much 
progress has been made, as well as the work left to do.  
 

